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The Sky is Falling- 
The ALI's Efficient Response to Courts in  Crisis? 
Our federal and state court systems are very busy.' 
Additionally, the number of cases that can be classified as 
"complex" is g r o ~ i n g . ~  Complex cases take more judicial time 
to resolve than routine cases.3 Many, including the Reporters 
of the American Law Institute's Complex Litigation Project, 
have looked at these numbers and speculated that changes 
must be made, else the court system will grind to a screeching 
halt.4 Like Chicken Little they have started screaming "the 
1. The national average pending case load per judgeship for July 1990 
through June 1991 was 422. CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT ADVISORY COMM., REPORT 
OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 12 (1991). 
Despite this fairly hefty caseload, there is little indication statistically that this 
case load is overwhelming. The national average from filing to disposition of a 
federal case in statistical year 1991 was nine months. Id. a t  14. The pending case 
load in Utah per judgeship is 426, id. at  12, with disposition taking an average of 
twelve months. Id. at  14. Despite the slightly higher than national average 
caseload the "existing ratio of district judges to total cases filed [in Utah] is very 
adequate." Id. a t  4. 
2. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND ANALYSIS WITH REPORTER'S STUDY 13 (1994) ("The causes 
of complex litigation . . . show no sign of diminishing, and the deleterious effects 
of these cases are bound to be felt.") [hereinafter COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL]; 
id. a t  14 (citing DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., RtENDS IN TORT LITIGATION: THE 
STORY BEHIND THE STATISTICS 8-11 (1987)) (stating that "mass latent injury cases 
have the potential for explosive growth" and that the system may well experience 
them as an explosion); Kyle Brackin, Comment, Salvaging the Wreckage: 
Multidistrict Litigation and Aviation, 57 J. L. & COM. 655, 658-59 (1992) ("[A] 
tortfeasor's ability to injure has grown astronomically in terms of the number of 
persons affected and the degree of possible harm."). This growth will result in 
more large-scale, complex lawsuits. 
3. See, e.g., In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1073 
(3d Cir. 1980) (trial estimated to last a full year); ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. 
International Bus. Mach. Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423, 426 (N.D. Cal. 1978), af'd sub 
nom. Memorex Corp. v. International Bus. Mach. Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 
1980) (trial lasted five months ending in mistrial after jury deadlocked); United 
States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 461 F. Supp. 1314 (D.D.C. 1978) (trial lasted 
11 months before settlement). 
4. See, e.g., COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 2, a t  14 (stating that 
absent a solution, complex litigation "will bankrupt both the state and federal court 
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sky is falling." But complex litigation has been around for a 
long time and the courts have continued to fun~t ion .~  Although 
we do not need to wait until the sky falls to make the courts 
more efficient, neither do we need to react hastily. 
Multiparty litigation has existed since the 1100s6 and has 
been facilitated in the United States by the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure since the 1930s.~ However, complex litigation, 
as this litigation has come to be known, really only began to 
cause judicial and academic consternation and discussion in the 
1950s when antitrust litigation burge~ned.~ Since then, 
various solutions to the management problems raised by 
litigation in general, and by complex litigation in particular, 
have been explored congress ion ally^ judicially," and in academia." 
systems") (quoting Judge Spencer Williams, Mass Tort Class Actions, Going, Going, 
Gone?, 98 F.R.D. 323, 324 (1983)); Brackin, supra note 2, at  658 (stating that 
complex litigation "overwhelm[s] the capacity of the courts to handle their 
caseloads adequately or efficiently"); Sherrill P. Hondorf, A Mandate for the 
Procedural Management of Mass Exposure Litigation, 16 N .  KY. L. REV. 541, 541 
(1989) (stating that complex litigation has caused "chaos in the judicial system"); 
Edward F. Sherman, Restructuring the Trial Process in the Age of Litigation, 63 
TEX. L. REV. 721, 722 (1984) (book review) (stating that complex litigation has 
"taxed the resources of our judicial system to the breaking point"). But see Edward 
Brunet, The Triumph of Eficiency and Discretion over Competing Complex 
Litigation Policies, 10 REV. LITIG. 273, 280 (1991) ("The Report's thesis-that the 
federal courts are in crisis--employs an incomplete calculus that overstates the 
costs to the system by ignoring the benefits of case adjudication."). 
5. See Zechariah J. Chafee, Jr., Bills of Peace with Multiple Parties, 45 
HARV. L. REV. 1297, 1297 (1932) (discussing the economies of consolidating 
"parallel litigations [which] involve one or more common questions of law or fact, 
or both"); STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE 
MODERN C W S  ACTION 38 (1987) (discussing the existence of multiparty litigation 
as early as 1199). 
6. YEAZELL, supra note 5, at  38. 
7. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (class actions); see also id. at  18 (joinder of claims 
and remedies); id. at  20 (joinder of parties); id. at  22 (interpleader); id. a t  24 
(intervention); id. at  42(a) (consolidation). All of these rules were adopted in 1937. 
8. Linda Mullenix, Problems in Complex Litigation, 10 REV. LITIG. 213, 215 
(1991). 
9. See 28 U.S.C. 5 1407 (Supp. V 1993) (governing the Judicial Panel on 
Multidistrict Litigation); Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 
$8 101-05, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990) (codified a t  28 U.S.C. $4 471-82 (Supp. I1 1990)) 
(requiring courts to consider the development of special procedures to handle 
complex cases); see also Stephen C. Yeazell, The Salience of Salience: A Comment 
on Professor Hazard's Authority in the Dock, 69 B.U. L. REV. 481, 485 (1989) 
(noting that in other countries, many issues that might produce nonroutine 
litigation are handled through the legislative or executive process rather than the 
judicial process). 
10. Judicially promulgated solutions include Procedure in Antitrust and Other 
Protracted Cases (otherwise known as the Prettyman Report) (adopted by the 
Judicial Conference of the United States on Sept. 26, 1951), reprinted in Leon R. 
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The American Law Institute's Complex Litigation Project 
proposal (the "Proposal") is the latest in a long line of proposed 
solutions. This Comment will first look at the Proposal and its 
underlying theme of efficiency, and then examine the 
relationship between efficiency and justice. This Comment 
discusses the basic consolidation criteria of the Proposal as 
they are applied to the difficulties caused by complex litigation 
in its pretrial, trial, and remedial stages. The author concludes 
that the Proposal inadequately treats these different types of 
complexities, and that its failure to do so has the potential of 
creating more complexity. Lastly, a consolidation mechanism 
that takes into account pretrial, trial, and remedial complexity 
as well as multiparty, multiforum complexity will be proposed. 
11. THE PROPOSAL AND EFFICIENCY 
While judicial, congressional, and academic solutions 
address the problems of managing complex litigation generally, 
the Proposal is concerned with complex litigation in its 
multiparty, multiforum f o r d 2  and focuses on consolidating 
litigation that involves "one or more common questions of fact" 
in a federal or state forum.13 To facilitate these goals, the 
Yankwich, "Short Cuts" in Long Cases, 13 F.R.D. 41, 62-84 (1953); Handbook of 
Recommended Procedures for the Trial of Protracted Cases, 25 F.R.D. 351 (1960); 
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX AND MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION (1970); MANUAL FOR 
COMPLEX LITIGATION, THIRD (1995) [hereinafter MCL 3D]. 
11. See, e.g., Richard D. Freer, Avoiding Duplicative Litigation: Rethinking 
PlaintiffAutonomy and the Court's Role in Defining the Litigative Unit, 50 U. PITT. 
L. REV. 809 (1989) (concluding that courts need to use existing mechanisms to 
aggressively package like cases); Hondorf, supra note 4; Martin I. Kaminsky, 
Proposed Federal Discovery Rules for Complex Civil Litigation, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 
907 (1980) (suggesting discovery rules especially tailored for the needs of complex 
cases); Linda S. Mullenix, Class Resolution of the Mass-Tort Case: A Proposed 
Federal Procedure Act, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1039 (1986); Jack Ratliff, Offensive 
Collateral Estoppel and the Option Effect, 67 TEX. L. REV. 63 (1988) (discussing the 
problems with nonmutual collateral estoppel and advocating class actions as a 
better vehicle for resolving duplicative litigation); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. & Kenneth 
D. Sibley, Beyond Diversity: Federal Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction, 135 U. 
PA. L. REV. 7 (1986) (suggesting an approach for creating federal subject matter 
jurisdiction for multiparty, multiforum litigation); Barry R. Schaller, Managerial 
Judging: A Principled Approach to Complex Cases in State Court, 68 CONN. B.J. 77 
(1994) (proposing rules which balance the need for judicial economy and the need 
for impartiality and protection of due process rights in managing complex cases); 
Roger H. Transgrud, Joinder Alternatives in Mass Tort Litigation, 70 CORNELL L. 
REV. 779 (1985) (discussing current joinder techniques and the overall desirability 
of joinder in mass tort cases). 
12. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 2, a t  7. 
13. See id. 5 3.01 (federal intrasystem consolidation); 5 4.01 (state court 
1000 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I995 
Proposal seeks to repeal and enact various federal transfer 
statutes14 as well as to create a Uniform Complex Litigation 
Act and an Interstate Complex Litigation Compact.15 
The underlying premise of the Project is that efficiency is 
the greatest good? The Proposal argues that the repetitive 
litigation that is the hallmark of mass tort and contract 
litigation "unduly expends the resources of attorney and client, 
burdens already overcrowded dockets, delays recompense for 
those in need, results in disparate treatment for persons 
harmed by essentially identical or similar conduct, and 
contributes to the negative image many people have of the 
legal system."17 The Proposal seeks to solve these problems of 
repetitive litigation by consolidating cases involving "one or 
more common questions of fact"18 in a state or federal court. 
The rationale is that resolution of multiparty, multiforum 
litigation by one or a few courts is more efficient than allowing 
those cases to be resolved separately. 
The Project defends its emphasis on efficiency by stating 
that a more efficient system can be more fair.lg The Proposal 
argues that multiparty, multiforum cases that are not 
consolidated are not justly resolved since like parties are 
treated di~similarly.~~ It further argues that failure to 
consolidate "has contributed to differences in appellate 
decisions that permit similarly injured plaintiffs to recover 
enormous awards in some jurisdictions, modest awards in 
others, and no awards in still others."21 However, justifying 
the sweeping changes suggested by the Proposal on the 
grounds that greater efficiency will lead to greater justice 
contradicts many of the basic policy decisions inherent in the 
American justice system. 
consolidation); 4 5.01 (federal-state intersystem consolidation). 
14. Id. app. a at 437-53. 
15. Id. app. b at 455-546. 
16. See id. at 7-20 (discussing problems caused by inefficiency). 
17. Id. at 7. 
18. Id. 4 3.Ol(a)(l). 
19. See id. at 19-20. 
20. Id. at 7 ("Repeated relitigation of the common issues in a complex case 
. . . results in disparate treatment for persons harmed by essentially identical or 
similar conduct."). 
21. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 2, at 15 n.8 (citing DEBORAH 
R. HENSLER ET AL., ASBESTOS IN THE COURTS: THE CHALLENGE OF h h S S  TOXIC 
TORTS 48-49 (1985)). 
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First, efficiency is not the model on which our government 
is based. We have two separate systems of government at  the 
state and federal levels. The Project's characterization of 
dissimilar awards as unjust fails to take into account the 
justice produced by our diverse system of state and federal 
laws. Our fragmented system inevitably produces disparate 
results for similar yet the system also checks the 
exercise of governmental power and thereby protects individual 
rights.23 Different results for like parties may thus be a cost of 
the greater protection provided by our federalist system. In any 
event, the greater efficiency achieved by the Project cannot be 
so easily justified by a short-sighted view of justice that fails to 
consider the justice produced by our system of dual 
government. We have accepted the inefficiency of dual state 
and federal systems of government in the hope that this 
inefficiency will lead to greater justice. 
Second, efficiency is not the primary goal of the federal 
government. The federal government is divided into judicial, 
legislative, and executive branches. These three branches were 
not made coequals for greater efficiency. Three branches of 
government were created to ensure to the people their 
rights-to ensure a just g ~ v e r n m e n t . ~ ~  
Third, even within one branch of government, our objective 
is not efficiency. The hallmark of our justice system is the jury 
Jury trials are not efficient. They are longer26 and 
22. See Brunet, supra note 4, a t  287 ("[Ilf victims of defective products reside 
in different states, consistent results are not necessarily desirable."); Russell J. 
Weintraub, Methods for Resolving Conflict-ofLaws Problems in Mass Tort 
Litigation, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 129, 134-35 (advocating methods that allow for 
different results in some mass torts because of different domiciles of victims). 
23. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at  321 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 
1987) ("In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people 
is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to 
each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security 
arises to the rights of the people."); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 
469 U.S. 528, 572 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("[Tlhe constitutionally mandated 
balance of power between the states and the Federal Government [is] . . . a 
balance designed to protect our fundamental liberties."). 
24. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison). 
25. See U.S. CONST. amends. VI, VII; THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, a t  464 
(Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) ("The friends and adversaries of 
the plan of the convention . . . concur a t  least in the value they set upon the trial 
by jury; or if there is any difference between them it consists in this: the former 
regard it as a valuable safeguard to liberty; the latter represent it as the very 
palladium of free government."). 
26. See Craig M. Bradley, Reforming the Criminal Trial, 68 IND. L.J. 659 
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more expensivez7 than bench trials. But we as a society have 
decided that jury trials lead to a more just result and are 
willing to pay for this inefficiency. 
The overriding goal of our government is justice, not 
efficiency. This is not to say that efficiency is undesirable. It is 
only to emphasize that efficiency must sometimes be sacrificed 
to the greater goal of justice. Only when we have satisfied 
ourselves that justice will be done should efficiency become a 
consideration. 
Rules can be adopted to make the state and federal court 
systems more efficient without sacrificing justice. The Proposal 
notes that the goal of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is 
the "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every 
a~tion."'~ It goes on to say that "[u]nfortunately, complex 
litigation can yield determinations that are slow, enormously 
expensive, and potentially unjust ."" These difficulties are 
apparently adequate justification for the Project's almost 
exclusive focus on the inefficiencies of complex litigation. The 
Proposal pays scant attention to how those inefficiencies may 
be necessary in reaching a just result. Additionally, as 
discussed in the remainder of this paper, the Proposal pays 
little attention to the potentially greater inefficiencies created 
by its recommendations. 
Jay Tidmarsh discusses four procedural features that are 
commonly thought to be indicators of complex litigati~n.~' 
(1993) (discussing the inefficiencies of time caused by jury trials); Mark S. Brodin, 
Accuracy, Eficiency, and Accountability in the Litigation Process-The Case for the 
Fact Verdict, 59 U .  Cm. L. REV. 15, 17-18 (1990) (discussing the length of jury 
trials and the inability of juries to deal effectively with the increasing length and 
complexity of cases). 
27. See Brodin, supra note 26, a t  17; Daniel B. Yeager, Categorical and 
Individualized Rights-Ordering on Federal Habeas Corpus, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
669, 671 n.15 (1994) ("We need plea bargaining because providing jury trials for all 
defendants who wish to contest their guilt is too expensive."). Disturbingly, the 
expense of a jury trial was used to justify excluding such a right from the Fugitive 
Slave Act of 1850, 9 Stat. 462. Senator Mason argued that the right to a jury trial 
would cause delay and expense and make it nearly impossible for slave owners to 
recover their property. See CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. app. 1584 (1850). 
28. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 2, at  16 (citing FED. R. CIV. 
P. 1). 
29. Id. 
30. Jay Tidmarsh, Unattainable Justice: The Form of Complex Litigation and 
the Limits of JucEicial Power, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683 (1992). 
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These features are "intractable pretrial proceedings; difficulties 
of proof and comprehension at trial; complications in the 
implementation or administration of a remedy; or the number 
of par tie^."^' The Project focuses on complexity caused by 
multiparty, multiforum litigation but fails to adequately 
account for the other three types of complexity, thereby 
creating further problems. This section discusses each of the 
four types of complexity, including how the Proposal affects 
those types of complexity and suggesting possible solutions to 
the problems created by each type of complexity. 
A. Complexity Caused by the Number of Parties 
The Proposal ignores many types of complexity2 and fo- 
cuses on the complexity cause by multiparty, multiforum litiga- 
tion. The Proposal uses the phrase "complex litigation" to "re- 
fern exclusively to multiparty, multiforum litigation [which] is 
characterized by related claims dispersed in several forums and 
often involving events that occurred over long periods of 
time."33 Despite its focus on multiparty, multiforum complexi- 
ty, the Proposal does not effectively resolve the problems 
caused by this type of complexity. 
Complex cases caused by multiparty, multiforum litigation 
"share two defining characteristics: they all involve the poten- 
tial for relitigation of identical or nearly identical issues, and 
consequently, they involve the enormous expenditure of re- 
source~. ' '~~ Examples of litigation satisfying these two criteria 
can be found in the asbestos litigation,s5 agent orange 
l i t i g a t i ~ n , ~ ~  silicone implant cases," and cases arising &om 
31. Id. a t  1701. 
32. The Proposal dismisses other types of complexity by stating that these 
types of complexities have been or are being dealt with by other groups. COMPLEX 
LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 2, a t  3-4. The Proposal's explanation for ignoring 
other kinds of complexities is disingenuous since others have also suggested solu- 
tions to multiparty, multiforum litigation and this fact has not stopped the ALI 
from going forward with the Project. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Unfinished Sym- 
phony: The Complex Litigation Project Rests, 54 LA. L. REV. 977, 991-93 (1994). 
33. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra, note 2, at  7. 
34. Id. 
35. "[Aln estimated twenty-seven million people . . . were exposed to signifi- 
cant concentrations of asbestos dust." David Rosenberg, The Dusting of America: A 
Story of Asbestos-Carnage, Cover-up, and Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1693, 1693 
(1986) (book review). T h e  estimated legal bill for all facets of the asbestos litiga- 
tion easily exceeds a billion dollars." Id. a t  1694. 
36. Chief Judge Weinstein and Judge Pratt certified a class of approximately 
2.4 million members in the agent orange litigation. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, 
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any airplane accident.38 These examples all involve multiple 
plaintiffs seeking recovery for very similar injuries from rela- 
tively few tortfeasors. The defendants are repeatedly asked to 
disclose the same information. Courts are repeatedly asked to 
decide the same questions of culpability. This repetition is time 
consuming and e~pensive.~' Thus, though the questions of law 
and fact may be simple, the large number of people involved 
have caused cases of this type to be deemed "complex litiga- 
tion." 
The Proposal purports to resolve the problems caused by 
multiparty, multiforum litigation. However, the Project's solu- 
tion may well create more problems than it resolves. Section 
3.01 of the Proposal provides the consolidation criterion. Cases 
that can potentially be consolidated are those that "involve one 
or more common questions of fact."40 This definition is overly 
broad, as is easily demonstrated. For example, one author has 
questioned whether, under the definition given by the Proposal, 
a "medical malpractice case [could] be complex if it arose from 
the use of a surgical procedure identical to the surgical proce- 
dure involved in unrelated actions against other physi- 
c i a n ~ [ . ] ' ~ ~  The commentary to the Proposal rejects such an 
outcome by stating that "[tlhe second element of the standard, 
requiring a finding that transfer will serve the just, efficient, 
and fair resolution of the actions, ensures that there will be 
substantial factual overlap . . . ."42 However, consolidation of 
cases questioning the efficacy of the surgical procedure would 
satisfy the second element of the standard. Consolidation would 
be efficient; the question of the efficacy of the procedure would 
be resolved in one consolidated action and would thus not be 
subject to relitigation. Additionally, consolidation would be 
supra note 2, a t  11. This class settled for $180 million in 1984. In re "Agent Or- 
ange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 689 F. Supp. 1250, 1252 (E.D.N.Y. 1988). 
37. As of September 1993, there were between 10,000 and 12,000 breast im- 
plant claims pending in United States courts. 19 THE GRAY SHEET (FDC Reports, 
Inc.), Sept. 13, 1993, at  1. Awards in early cases ranged from $1.5 million to $25 
million ($20 million in punitive damages). Susan A. Casey, Laying an Old Doctrine 
to Rest: Challenging the Wisdom of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine, 19 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 931, 932 n.4 (1993). 
38. "Airlines pay from $3,500 to $17,000 per victim in legal fees." Brackin, 
supra note 2, a t  656 n.4. 
39. See supra notes 3, 33-37 and accompanying text. 
40. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 2, $ 3.01(a)(l). 
41. Tidmarsh, supra note 30, at  1713. 
42. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 2, at  43. 
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deemed just and fair since patients subjected to the same surgi- 
cal procedure would receive the same treatment by the judicial 
system. Although it is unlikely that cases involving the same 
surgical technique would be consolidated, the Proposal 
definitionally would allow such an outcome. 
The Project implicitly acknowledges the overbreadth of its 
definition by giving the transferee court power to separate 
consolidated cases into smaller groups involving common ques- 
t i o n ~ . ~ ~  For example, in asbestos litigation a transferee court 
could separate into different groups and send to different courts 
cases involving lung cancer, mesothelioma, asbestosis, and 
pleural claims." 
Not only does the overbreadth which necessitates bifurca- 
tion create inefficiency, the bifurcation process itself creates 
inefficiency. Bifurcation is expensive and time c~nsuming.~' 
Additional inefficiency is created if the transferee court trans- 
fers all of the bifurcated cases back to itself for the determina- 
tion of an issue such as damages. The necessity for bihrcation 
could be eliminated if the Complex Litigation (the 
"Panel"), instead of consolidating all asbestos cases and trans- 
ferring them all to one judge, sent all asbestosis claims to one 
judge and all mesothelioma cases to another judge from the 
outset. Time savings would be greater even if all the cases 
were subsequently transferred to one judge for the resolution of 
damages claims. 
Section 3.01 is an attempt to resolve the problem of multi- 
party, multiforum litigation by consolidating cases involving 
"one or more common questions of fact."47 As has been shown, 
this standard is overly broad and can potentially cause even 
greater inefficiency than the unconsolidated resolution of cas- 
e ~ . ' ~  A better solution might be to allow consolidation only if 
43. Id. 5 3.06. 
44. See Linda S .  Mullenix, Beyond Consolidation: Postaggregative Procedure in 
Asbestos Mass Tort Litigation, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 475, 569 (1991) (discussing 
the trial approach of Judge Parker in the Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc. litiga- 
tion, No. B-86-0456-CA (E.D. Tex. Nov. 12, 1990)). 
45. See MCL 3D, supra note 10, 5 21.632 (noting the possibility of "increased 
cost . . . and inconvenience" with bifurcation); 9 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. 
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 5 2388 (1971) (describing risks and 
benefits of bifurcation). 
46. The Complex Litigation Panel is comprised of federal judges who decide 
whether to consolidate multiparty, multiforum cases and where to transfer those 
cases. See COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 2, 5 3.02. 
47. Id. 5 3.01(a)(l). 
48. Tidmarsh, supra note 30, at 1714 ("The huge cases created by assembling 
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the common questions of fact arise fkom the conduct of one or 
more common parties. Additionally, greater efficiency can be 
attained within the proposed system if the Complex Litigation 
Panel consolidates groups of like cases rather then sending all 
cases to a transferee court from which groups of like cases are 
separated and transferred. 
B. Complexity in Pretrial Proceedings 
Complexity in pretrial proceedings is a result of lengthy 
andlor voluminous discovery.4g Difficult legal or factual issues 
are not enough to make a case complex a t  the pretrial stage. 
Lawyers are trained to resolve difficult legal or factual issues. 
However, "'voluminous' or 'protracted' discovery . . . precludes 
the lawyers from performing their adversarial task-the craft- 
ing of persuasive and comprehensive  argument^."^^ 
Case management is crucial to resolving pretrial complexi- 
ty. As observed by James Withrow and Richard Larm: 
[Tlhe crux of truly fair and efficient management of large 
cases is still '"ion-hearted" control by the judge. . . . [Llarge 
antitrust litigations would be better controlled and certainly 
more fairly adjudicated if it were frankly recognized that 
pretrial, and not trial, is where the merits of such cases are 
revealed. Trial, if it occurs at all, is but the final denouement 
of pretrial adjudication, save in the case where pretrial re- 
sponsibilities have been neglected by the presiding judge." 
Failure to manage pretrial discovery in large cases leads to 
chaotic and expensive discovery and to complexity during the 
trial. "One of the primary objectives in managing complex cases 
is the development of procedures to clarify and narrow the 
issues in disp~te."'~ 
Section 3.01 of the Proposal which articulates the factors to 
be taken into account prior to consolidation does not list pretri- 
all the parties in one forum . . . might generate the pretrial, trial, and remedial 
difficulties oRen associated with multiparty suits."). 
49. DAVID W. LOUISELL ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PLEADING AND 
PROCEDURE 1223 (6th ed. 1989) ("Complex cases can be identified by the fact that 
they involve large stakes, broad-ranging discovery, and sometimes multiple par- 
ties."). 
50. Tidmarsh, supra note 30, at 1703. 
51. James R. Withrow & Richard P. Larm, The "Big" Antitrust Case: 25 Years 
of Sisyphean Labor, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 5 (1976). 
52. Andrew J. Simons, The Manual for Complex Litigation- More Rules or 
Mere Recommendations?, 62 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 493, 503 (1988). 
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a1 complexity as a factor. Consideration of pretrial complexity 
may be implicitly found in the requirement that "transfer and 
consolidation . . . promote the just, efficient, and fair conduct of 
the actions."53 However, consideration of pretrial complexity 
should be an articulated factor of consideration for a number of 
reasons. First, the mass consolidation of multiparty, 
multiforum cases has the potential to create pretrial complexity 
that would not have been present in individually pursued cas- 
es. Pretrial complexity can lead to sloppy formulation of the 
issues. Sloppy issue-formulation may in turn lead to sloppy 
trial presentation54 and a potentially unjust resolution. Sec- 
ond, pretrial complexity may lead to a prolonged period of dis- 
covery, thereby unduly postponing recovery. And, as the Pro- 
posal points out, "someone who is not wealthy and [is] seriously 
injured may find that justice delayed is, indeed, justice de- 
nied."55 Third, mass consolidation may lead to unexpected con- 
flicts of interest, depriving parties of counsel they would other- 
wise have been able to rely on.56 Finally, pretrial complexity 
and confusion of the issues intensified by consolidation may 
deter settlement. "The process of reaching a settlement re- 
quires each side to evaluate the risks and opportunities inher- 
ent in continuing the litigation and balance them against the 
gains and costs of settling a t  a particular price."57 If the par- 
ties are unable to evaluate these risks accurately, the chances 
of settlement are harmed. Settlement, particularly of a complex 
case, is far more efficient than taking a case to trial. 
In considering consolidation, the Complex Litigation Panel 
should evaluate the extent to which pretrial complexities can 
be res~lved.'~ For example, different methods of alternative 
dispute resolution might be used to resolve little-disputed fac- 
53. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 2, § 3.01(a)(2). 
54. See Tidmarsh, supra note 30, a t  1703. 
55. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 2, a t  16. 
56. See MCL 3 9  supra note 10, § 20.23 (advising the initial investigation of 
any possible conflicts of interests caused by consolidation). 
57. WILLLAM W. SCHWARZER, MANAGING ANI"l'UST AND OTHER COMPLEX LITI- 
GATION 193 (1982). 
58. See, e.g. WAYNE D. BRAZIL ET AL., MANAGING COMPI;EX LITIGATION: A 
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE USE OF SPECIAL MASTERS (1983); PRACTISING LAW INSTI- 
TUTE, THE COORDINATION A D MANAGEMENT OF MAJOR LITIGATION (1982); TORT & 
INSURANCE PRACTICE SECTION, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, MANAGING COMPLEX 
LITIGATION (1991); MCL 3D, supra note 10, Recommendations on Major Issues 
Affecting Complex Litigation (1981); CIVIL JUSTICE R FORM ACT ADVISORY COMM., 
supra note 1; SCHWARZER, supra note 57; Dennis A. Kendig, Procedures for Man- 
agement of Non-Routine Cases, 3 HOFSTRA L. REV. 701 (1975). 
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tual questions, eliminating the need for voluminous document 
production on those points. Additionally, a special master or 
magistrate judge could be appointed to coordinate and facilitate 
pretrial discovery and issue for~nulation.~~ 
The extent to which pretrial complexities can be resolved 
may depend in large part on the ability or inclination of the 
transferee court to be actively involved in pretrial manage- 
ment. Thus, once the decision to consolidate has been made, 
the Panel should take into account the managerial style of the 
transferee judge when assigning the case." The Panel should 
also consider whether the assignee court has promulgated a 
Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plan as required by 
the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990~' and what the Plan pro- 
vides for in terms of case management.62 Finally, the Panel 
should consider the extent to which the court has opted out of 
the new discovery rules adopted by the Judicial Conference in 
December 1993.~~ Courts that have a functioning Civil Justice 
Reform Act Plan and that have adopted the new discovery 
rules are more likely to have the tools necessary to facilitate 
efficient discovery and pretrial planning in a consolidated case. 
C. Complexity During Trial 
Complexity during the trial can be a product of "large 
amounts of evidence in a constrained, pressure-filled situa- 
t i ~ n , " ~ ~  or the inability of a decision maker to make a rational 
59. See BRAZIL ET AL., supra note 58. "A special master is a private attorney, 
a law professor, or a retired judge who is appointed, with or without the consent 
of the parties, to assist the judge in performing some of his or her functions." Id. 
a t  1 n.2; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 53 (authorization for appointment of special mas- 
ters); 28 U.S.C. $$ 631-36 (1988) (statutory authorization of magistrates); Peter G. 
McCabe, The Federal Magistrate Act of 1979, 16 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 343, 380 
(1979) (stating that the Federal Magistrate Act "provides the federal trial courts 
with a long-range, standby resource which can supplement the judges in efficient 
and expeditious disposition of the business of the courts"). 
60. Mullenix, supra note 44, at  486 ("Judge [Robert M.1 Parker [of Cimino v. 
Raymark Indus., Inc., No. B-86-0456-CA (E.D. Tex. Nov. 12, 1990)l assumed the 
role of a highly activist, managerial judge, whereas Judge [James McGirrl Kelly 
[writing in In  re Asbestos School Litig., 768 F. Supp. 146 (E.D. Pa. 1991)l assumed 
a reactive, non-interventionist posture." Note that Judge Parker's case came to trial 
much sooner than Judge Kelly's case. Mullenix, supra, note 44, at  486.). 
61. $5 101-05, 104 Stat. 5089. 
62. See, e.g., CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT ADVISORY COMM., supra note 1, a t  
58-70. 
63. See Robert Pass, Big Changes in the Federal Rules, 20 LITIG., Summer 
1994, a t  10-11. 
64. Tidmarsh, supra note 30, a t  1704. 
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decision based on the evidence presented. The first aspect of 
trial complexity may create or contribute to the second aspect 
of trial complexity. Once again, the Proposal fails to discuss the 
problem of trial complexity. Presumably, the requirement that 
consolidation "promote the just, efficient, and fair conduct of 
the actions" allows consideration of trial complexity prior to 
consolidation. However, as in the case of pretrial complexity, 
failure to specifically take trial complexity into account prior to 
consolidation may create more inefficiency than it resolves. 
Trial complexity, due to the volume of evidence, can be 
resolved in many of the same ways that pretrial complexity is 
resolved.65 For example, special masters may be used in the 
pretrial stages to resolve evidentiary disputes,66 thus facilitat- 
ing the admission of evidence. Trial bifurcation can reduce the 
volume of evidence to be managed in each trial. Computer 
programs can be enlisted to organize and present evidence. 
The greatest hazard posed by the presentation of volumi- 
nous amounts of evidence is that it contributes to fact finder 
dysfunction.67 Many solutions have been proposed to the prob- 
lem of decision makers' incomprehension, and in particular jury 
incomprehension. Better management and presentation of evi- 
dence, as mentioned above, may ease the situation. Judicial 
interrogation of witnesses may help both jury and judicial com- 
prehension of issues by removing the gloss added by counsel. 
"[A] number of [other] procedures for improving jury compre- 
hension in complex multiparty civil litigation [can be used], 
such as bifurcated trials, preliminary and interim jury instruc- 
tions, interim summations, juror note-taking and questions, 
detailed jury instructions, and special verdicts."68 
More radical solutions to the problem of jury comprehen- 
sion include trying complex cases before special "blue ribbon" 
juries composed of experts in the subject matter of the dis- 
65. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text. 
66. See BRAZIL ET AL., supra note 58, at 12. 
67. See Brunet, supra note 4, at 278-79; Tidmarsh, supra note 30, at 1766. 
68. Mullenix, supra note 44, at 566; see also Committee on Fed. Courts of the 
N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Improving Jury Comprehension in Complex Civil Litigation, 
62 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 549 (1988) (focusing on the relationship between judge and 
jury while analyzing various techniques which may be employed to aid the jury in 
fulfilling its role); Elizabeth A. Faulkner, Note, Using the Special Verdict to Man- 
age Complex Cases and Avoid Compromise Verdicts, 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 297, 325 
(1989) ("The special verdict allows the trial judge to control the jury, simplify jury 
instructions, and place the jury findings on the record for appellate review, thus 
reducing unnecessary trials."). 
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p ~ t e , ~ '  or eliminating the jury altogether and appointing judg- 
es expert in the area to hear the cases.70 The constitutionality 
of eliminating a jury trial altogether in complex cases has been 
q~estioned.~' However, Justice Marshall in Peters v. ~ i f P ~  
acknowledged a due process right to a competent tribunal, stat- 
ing, 
The due process right to a competent and impartial tribunal 
is quite separate from the right to any particular form of 
proceeding. . . . Long before this Court held that the Constitu- 
tion imposes the requirement of jury trial on the States, it 
was well established that the Due Process Clause protects a 
defendant from jurors who are actually incapable of rendering 
an impartial verdict, based on the evidence and the law.73 
The Third Circuit has found that when the complexity of the 
evidence prevents a jury from coming to a rational verdict 
there is no right to a jury trial.74 However, the Ninth Circuit 
has rejected such a notion stating that the Seventh Amend- 
ment does not contain an exception for complex cases.75 The 
Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the issue, and 
until it does the remaining circuits are sitting on the fence.76 
69. See William V. Luneburg & Mark A. Nordenberg, Specially Qualified 
Juries and Expert Nonjury Tribunals: Alternatives for Coping with the Complexities 
of Modern Civil Litigation, 67 VA. L, REV. 887 (1981). 
70. Paul Lansing & Nina Miley, The Right to a Jury Trial in Complex Com- 
mercial Litigation: A Comparative Law Perspective, 14 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. 
L.J. 121, 135-37 (1991) (discussing a Pennsylvania proposal to create a commercial 
court to try certain disputes without a jury before a specially trained business law 
judge). 
71. Patrick Devlin, Equity, Due Process and the Seventh Amendment: A Com- 
mentary on the Zenith Case, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1571 (1983); Lansing & Miley, su- 
pra note 70; Richard 0. Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Let's Not Rush 
to Judgment, 80 MICH. L. REV. 68 (1981). 
72. 407 U.S. 493 (1972). 
73. Id. at 501. 
74. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1084-86 (3d 
Cir. 1980). 
75. I n  re United States Fin. Secs. Litig., 75 F.R.D. 702 (S.D. Cal. 1977)' rev'd, 
609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 929 (1980) (The district court 
refused jury demands on the ground that the case was too complex. The Ninth 
Circuit reversed on the ground that there is no complexity element to the Seventh 
Amendment.). 
76. See Soderbeck v. Burnett County, 752 F.2d 285, 289 (7th Cir. 1985) ('We 
need take no position here [as to the theory] that trial by jury violates due process 
of law if the suit 'is too complex for a jury to understand and decide rationally'."); 
Phillips v. Kaplus, 764 F.2d 807, 814 (11th Cir. 1985) ('While at  least one circuit 
has suggested that mere complexity of facts alone can provide the basis for . . . 
the denial of a jury trial, we have not done so, and we do not do so here" (cita- 
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The Panel should consider whether consolidation will exac- 
erbate the problems caused by trial complexity. Prior to trans- 
fer of a consolidated action, the Panel should consider whether 
the transferee court allows the creation of special juries or the 
elimination of a jury altogether. However, the Panel should 
also consider that the elimination of a jury trial due to com- 
plexity, artificially created by the consolidation of numerous 
cases, raises even greater questions of constitutionality than 
the elimination of a jury trial in inherently complex cases. 
Additionally, transfer to a court that will remove a complex 
case from the jury, when the case was originally filed in a court 
which will not allow the elimination of a jury trial due to com- 
plexity, undermines party expectations. This problem is also 
likely to undermine party satisfaction with the resolution of the 
case. Party dissatisfaction similarly may arise from the fourth 
and final type of complexity, complexity in the implementation 
of the remedy. 
D. Complexity in the Remedy 
Remedial complexity is caused by the creation and at- 
tempted implementation of administratively unmanageable 
remedies.?? A result of remedial complexity is the inability of 
the parties "to implement the declared remedy."?' "[TI he re- 
medial phase in complex cases often lasts far longer, and is far 
more costly in terms of judicial and attorney resources, than 
the high-profile pre-remedial phase."7g Since victory without a 
workable remedy is hollow,g0 any proposed solution to the 
problem of complex litigation that does not discuss remedial 
complexity is illusory. The Proposal notes that there are "cer- 
tions omitted).). 
77. Tidmarsh, supra note 30, a t  1709. Remedial complexity generally mani- 
fests itself in two forms: the complexity caused by the "inordinate expense in ob- 
taining and managing the information needed to choose a proper remedy, or the 
necessity of solomonic, creative, and somewhat unprincipled solutions to intractable 
remedial questions," and the complexity of administering the remedy once it is 
fashioned. Id. 
78. Id. at  1773. 
79. Id. at  1709; see also Peter H .  Schuck, The Role of Judges in Settling 
Complex Cases: The Agent Orange Example, 53 U .  C H I .  L. REV. 337, 338 n.7 (1986) 
(stating that in a complex case, "any judgment or settlement reached, even one for 
money damages, is likely to be difficult to implement"). 
80. Tidrnarsh, supm note 30, a t  1774 ("If the rational application of fact to 
law dictates in theory a result impossible to accomplish in practice, the legal decla- 
ration is a nullity."). 
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tain 'complex' forms of relief"" but does not go beyond this 
rather terse statement to propose solutions to the problem of 
remedial complexity. Neither does the Project acknowledge that 
by consolidating multiparty, multiforum cases the Proposal 
itself may be creating cases the resolution of which will require 
"certain 'complex' forms of relief." 
Remedial complexity can result in failure to implement the 
declared remedy when one or more of the following problems is 
present: first, if there are too many parties to the remedy re- 
sulting in administrative chaos (administrative remedial com- 
plexity); second, if there are not enough parties to the remedy, 
resulting in a party vital to the implementation of the remedy 
being outside the court's control (absentee remedial complexi- 
ty); or third, if implementation of the remedy is so expensive 
that the parties, though they may be willing, are unable to 
implement the solution (implementation remedial complexity). 
1. Administrative remedial complexity 
Remedial complexity that is a result of administrative 
difficulties caused by the presence of too many parties has been 
resolved in a number of ways. Courts have created claims-reso- 
lution facilities in a number of mass tort  situation^.^^ The 
court, in In re Joint Eastern & Southern Districts Asbestos 
Litigation, created the Manville Personal Injury Settlement 
Trust.83 In the Agent Orange litigation, the court established 
guidelines that claimants had to meet in order to claim com- 
pensation from the court established fund." These claims res- 
olution facilities reduce administrative complexity by creating a 
central facility to which claimants present their claims, estab- 
lishing uniform standards for claim relief, and subjecting the 
remedial process to judicial review. A less elaborate approach 
to resolving administrative remedial complexity would be to 
81. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 2, at 3. 
82. Symposium, Claims Resolution Facilities and the Mass Settlement of Mass 
Torts, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1990) (describing operation of claim-resolu- 
tion facilities in asbestos, Agent Orange, Dalkon Shield, and Triana cases). 
83. See 129 B.R. 710, 751-56, 838-46 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
84. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 689 F. Supp. 1250, 
1263-66 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 681 F.2d 1259, 
1266 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1247 (1984); see generally, Develop- 
ments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1318, 1516-36 (1976) (discuss- 
ing calculation and distribution of damages in class actions). 
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appoint masters, magistrates, and implementation committees 
to create remedial plans and give  recommendation^.^^ 
2. Absentee remedial complexity 
The Project recognizes the problems that arise when par- 
ties necessary to a solution are not present before the court. 
Section 5.05 of the Proposal provides for forced intervention by, 
or the preclusion of, claims by nonparties that have claims 
involving "one or more questions of fact in common with the 
actions pending before the . . . court."86 Section 5.05 resolves 
one prong of the "not enough people" problem-it binds all 
similarly situated plaintiffs by the court's decision. However, it 
does not necessarily allow the court to join defendants neces- 
sary to the implementation of the remedy. 
Additionally, this expanded notion of issue and claim pre- 
clusion seems manifestly unfair. Mandatory intervention forces 
individuals to abdicate their own choice of forum and to partici- 
pate in litigation that involves so many parties and so much 
procedure that the psychological and actual value of having 
one's case heard "may be lost or triviali~ed."~' Mandatory in- 
tervention results in a loss of dignity for the party.88 A "Rand 
85. See, e.g., Bradley v. Milliken, 620 F.2d 1143, 1156-58 (6th Cir.) (requiring 
experts who are employed to assist the court in creating a remedial plan to pre- 
pare written reports to be placed in the record), cert. denied, 449 US. 870 (1980); 
Hamilton v. Landrieu, 351 F. Supp. 549 (E.D. La. 1972) (adopting special master's 
recommendations for changes in prison routine); Mullenix, supra note 44, a t  545- 
50, 558-64 (describing use of a court-appointed expert in a group trial to determine 
damages in an asbestos class). 
86. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 2, 4 5.05(a)(l). 
87. Brunet, supra note 4, at  297. The Proposal mentions that repetitive litiga- 
tion may undermine the legitimacy of the courts, COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, 
supra note 2, a t  7, but fails to recognize that an important part of fairness is the 
ability to be heard. Consolidation that devalues a party's ability to be heard may 
encounter constitutional problems, for, as the Court in Grannis v. Ordean stated, 
"The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard." 
234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914). See also Judith Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation", 54 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1991, a t  5, 65. Additionally, "aggregation may 
dim our capacity to see injustice." Id. An example of this principle in action is the 
Agent Orange class consolidation. The concern in creating a class 2.4 million per- 
sons strong appears to be less with addressing the injustices suffered by the vic- 
tims than with just getting the cases out of the courts. See also Roger H. 
Trangsrud, Mass Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 69, 69 
(stating that individuals examining the aggregation of mass torts have given 
"[ilnsufficient attention . . . [to] the fairness of such proceedings to individual 
plaintiffs"). 
88. Brunet, supra note 4, at  297; see also Stephen C. Yeazell, Collective Lit- 
igation as Collective Action, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 43, 44 (stating that involuntary 
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Institute study comparing client perceptions of litigation, arbi- 
tration, and settlement conferences concluded that dignity was 
evaluated as especially important to perceived fairness and 
litigant satisfaction. Indeed, litigants rated dignity the highest 
procedural concern of those values essential to a fair adjudica- 
tory pro~edure."~~ The Reporters indicate that one of the con- 
cerns behind the Project is that "[rlepeated relitigation . . . 
contributes to the negative image many people have of the 
legal system."g0 It seems likely that the mandatory interven- 
tion suggested by the Proposal that results in the undignified 
treatment of litigants will contribute even more than repeated 
relitigation to the "negative image many people have of the 
legal system." After all, there is less cause for concern if the 
legal system is slow and repetitive but nevertheless functions 
properly than if the legal system fails to fulfill its role. 
3. Implementational remedial complexity 
The Project does not address remedial complexity caused 
when a defendant fails to implement the remedy because of his 
or her financial inability to pay the damage award. However, 
solutions to this type of remedial complexity can be developed 
by considering the problems raised by asbestos, "[tlhe giant of 
complex litigati~n."~' It takes little imagination to conclude 
that the repeated award of punitive damages helped drive 
asbestos manufacturer Johns-Manville into b a n k r ~ p t c y . ~ ~  Per-
sons claiming asbestos caused illnesses after the Johns- 
Manville bankruptcy have been treated differently than claim- 
ants who participated in the bankruptcy pro~eedings.'~ Simply 
stated, the repeated award of punitive damages contributed to 
participation in complex litigation brings with it questions about "kidnapped" par- 
ticipants). 
89. Brunet, supra note 4, a t  284 (footnotes omitted) (citing E. ALLEN LIND ET 
AL., THE PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE: TORT LITIGANTS' VIEWS OF TRIAL, COURT-AN- 
NEXED ARBITRATION AND JUDICIAL SET~LEMENT CONFERENCES 62-63 (1989)). 
90. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 2, at  7. 
91. Id. at 10. 
92. See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 31 B.R. 965 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); see also 
Note, The Manville Bankruptcy: Treating Mass Tort Claims in Chapter 11 Proceed- 
ings, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1122 (1983) ("Manville and UNR Industries are the 
first such apparently healthy corporations to file chapter eleven petitions in the 
face of massive tort claims."). 
93. See COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 2, a t  12 (discussing 
whether a bankruptcy court "can achieve equity between early- and late-filing 
claimants"). 
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the bankruptcy of Johns-Manville, which led to the inequitable 
treatment of postbankruptcy claimants. 
Punitive damage reform has been much discussed." How- 
ever, disregarding the need or even the desirability of punitive 
damages reform, the Proposal's consolidation mechanism could 
be used to resolve more efficiently the problems caused by the 
repeated award of punitive damages, thus decreasing remedial 
complexity caused by inability to pay. The Panel could, instead 
of consolidating all asbestos claims, only consolidate the ques- 
tion of punitive damages. The transferee court would determine 
the total punitive damage award. This award would be used to 
establish a punitive damage award fund. Asbestos claimants 
who were awarded punitive damages in separate unconsolidat- 
ed trials could then apply to the fund for a portion of the previ- 
ously determined punitive damage award. This solution has the 
advantages of giving qualified claimants a piece of the punitive 
damage pie and preventing the repeated punishment of a de- 
fendant for the same egregious behavior. As shown below, the 
consolidation of common questions of punitive damages pro- 
motes the Project's goal of efficiency. In short, consolidation of 
punitive damage claims alleviates the problem of remedial 
complexity, because it reduces the likelihood that the court will 
impose damages that are beyond the defendant's ability to pay, 
and it puts the onus of collecting the punitive damages award 
on the individual plaintiffs rather than requiring the defendant 
to contact a multitude of plaintiffs. 
The Proposal inadequately addresses the problem of reme- 
dial complexity. Prior to consolidation the Panel should consid- 
er whether consolidation will create remedial complexity due to 
the sheer number of parties involved. Additionally, the Panel 
should consider whether the mandatory intervention provision 
of section 5.05 will create more problems in terms of litigant 
dissatisfaction than it resolves in terms of remedial complexity 
94. See, e.g., Jimmie 0. Clements, Jr., Limiting Punitive Damages: A Placebo 
for America's Ailing Competitiveness, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 197 (1992); Stephen 
Daniels & Joanne Martin, Myth and Reality in Punitive Damages, 75 MINN. L. 
REV. 1 (1990); Michael Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in Products Lia- 
bility: Testing Tort Anecdotes with Empirical Data, 78 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1992); Jona- 
than Kagan, Comment, Toward a Uniform Application of Punishment: Using the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines as a Model for Punitive Damage Reform, 40 UCLA 
L. REV. 753 (1993); Lynda A. Sloane, Note, The Split Award Statute: A Move To- 
ward Effectuating the True Purpose of Punitive Damages, 28 VAL. U .  L. REV. 473 
(1993). 
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caused by the absence of necessary parties. Finally, the Panel 
should consider whether remedial complexity, caused by inabil- 
ity to pay damage awards, can be resolved by consolidating 
only the question of damages. 
IV. CONCLUSION: ANOTHER PROPOSAL 
Section 3.01 of the Proposal provides the standard for con- 
solidation of multiparty, multiforum cases. This section pro- 
vides: 
(a) Actions commenced in two or more United States District 
Courts may be transferred and consolidated if 
(1) they involve one or more common questions of fact, 
and 
(2) transfer and consolidation will promote the just, effi- 
cient, and fair conduct of the actions. 
(b) Factors to be considered in deciding whether the standard 
set forth in subsection (a) is met include 
(1) the extent to which transfer and consolidation will 
reduce duplicative litigation, the relative costs of indi- 
vidual and consolidated litigation, the likelihood of incon- 
sistent adjudications, and the comparative burdens on 
the judiciary, and 
(2) whether transfer and consolidation can be accom- 
plished in a way that is fair to the parties and does not 
result in undue inconvenience to them and the witness- 
As discussed above, these criteria inadequately address the 
problems of pretrial, trial, remedial, and multiparty complexity. 
Because of these inadequacies, it is likely that consolidation 
under these criteria would lead to greater inefficiencies than 
would have existed had there been no consolidation. A standard 
for consolidation that better addresses the problems of complex 
litigation as a whole is presented below. 
(a) Actions commenced in two or more United States District 
Courts may be transferred and consolidated if: 
(1) they involve one or more common questions of fact 
arising from the conduct of one or more common parties, 
and 
(2) transfer and consolidation will promote the just, effi- 
cient, and fair conduct of the actions. 
95. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 2, $ 3.01. 
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(b) Factors to be considered in deciding whether consolidation 
under the standard set forth in subsection (a) is met include 
(1) the extent to which transfer and consolidation will in- 
crease administrative difficulties of the pretrial, trial, 
and remedial phases of the litigation, thus making a just 
resolution of the consolidated case less likely, and 
(2) whether transfer and consolidation can be accom- 
plished in a way that upholds the dignity of the parties 
and does not result in undue inconvenience to them and 
the witnesses; and 
(3) whether transfer and consolidation will increase the 
likelihood that resolution of the case will result in a ef- 
fective remedy. 
The requirement in (a)(l) that the common question of fact 
arise from the conduct of one or more common parties prevents 
the prospect of the consolidation of cases of victims of the same 
surgical technique practiced by different doctors.96 The re- 
quirement in (a)(l) also prevents tortfeasors from being 
grouped together, and thereby prejudiced by another 
tortfeasor's actions, merely for creating the same product re- 
gardless of ~ollaboration.~~ 
Subsection (b)(l) makes it clear that pretrial, trial, and 
remedial administrative difficulties caused by consolidation 
should be considered prior to consolidation. If consolidation 
would lead to administrative difficulties that would jeopardize 
the just resolution of the case, then regardless of the inefficien- 
cy, consolidation is not justified. Subsection (b)(2) takes into 
account a party's reaction to consolidation. The preservation of 
a party's dignity is important in ensuring that litigants feel the 
legal system has served them well.'' The addition of (b)(3) is 
necessary to recognize that consolidation that results in a rem- 
edy that can not be implemented is of little value." Remedy 
implementation should be considered prior to consolidation. 
The primary goal in resolving any case is a just result, not 
simply an efficient result. A case should be resolved efficiently 
and justly if possible, but the main purpose of our justice sys- 
96. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text. 
97. Tortfeasors who may be found liable under theories of market share lia- 
bility (e.g., asbestos manufacturers) would still be lumped together since the 
tortfeasors are common defendants to each case using the market share theory of 
recovery. 
98. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text. 
99. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
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tem should be the administration of justice. The ALI proposes 
the consolidation of cases involving "one or more common ques- 
tions of fact." Consolidation under the criteria suggested by the 
Proposal could lead to a just and efficient result. However, 
because the Project fails to consider any aspects of complex 
litigation other than multiparty, multiforum litigation, it is 
likely that consolidation will actually lead to greater inefficien- 
cies and greater injustice in many cases. Thus, problems of 
pretrial, trial, and remedial complexity need to be considered 
as well as problems raised by multiparty, multiforum cases. 
Additionally, greater consideration needs to be paid to party 
concerns prior to consolidation. Although our courts are busy, it 
is premature to say the sky is falling. It is even more prema- 
ture to assume that we would prefer an efficient result to a just 
result in the event that the sky did fall. As James Madison 
stated in Federalist No. 51, "[j]ustice is the end of govern- 
ment."lOO We cannot deviate from that end. 
Christine Gail Clark 
100. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 
1987). 
